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ON DISARMAMENT

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Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 5 June 1962, at 10 a.m.

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

Chairman:

Mr. DEAN

(United States of America)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELLO-FRANCO
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS
Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. N. MINTCHEV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIABONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U Tin MAUNG

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.E.F. HARDY
Mr. J.F.M. BELL
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. E. PEPICH
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. M. HAMID
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. K.K. RAO
Mr. G.D. COMAR

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAGIATI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. M. BIEN
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. C. SANDRU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. G.A. WESTRING
Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. B.P. KRASOULIN
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. G. El ABD
Mr. M.S. AHMED
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. J.K. WRIGHT
Lord NORWICH

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. V. BAKER
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare open the forty-ninth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): The Working Draft of Part I of the treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/40/Rev.1) submitted for examination to our Committee by the two co-Chairmen indicates the achievement of agreement on a number of issues, which undoubtedly constitutes a certain amount of progress. I should like today to make some comments of principle arising from the divergences which continue to be manifest on fundamental issues of the disarmament problem.

Indeed, from the first reading of this document one realizes that the United States delegation is maintaining its unrealistic stand on a number of problems the solution of which is essential for the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

We are, of course, aware that this is only the first reading of the draft treaty and that we shall all have an opportunity to revert to these articles in order to remove existing divergences. Nevertheless, I consider that these divergences must be brought out as clearly as possible right now, so that the whole Committee can see who is in fact for general and complete disarmament, and who declares for disarmament in words while opposing it in fact.

Such divergences arise even over the title of Part I. While the Soviet Delegation proposes that Part I should be entitled "General Treaty Obligations", the United States delegation proposes as a title "Outline of Treaty obligations". These are not divergences of little importance, or a play on words; nor are they divergences of a formal nature. They are divergences of substance. In fact the attitude adopted by States towards this problem points to the real stand of the parties towards the essence of things, towards the very task which has been entrusted to us.

We find here the opposition of the United States Government to the working out of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. We know that in his speeches the representative of the United States has admitted that the conclusion of such a treaty is our main task. But in fact he continues to support the idea of an outline of general obligations of disarmament. But, as has been pointed out by numerous representatives during previous debates, the stage of outlining general and complete

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disarmament has long been left behind. The general outlines were established through the joint Soviet-United States statement of 20 September 1961 (ENDC/5), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (A/RES/1660(XVI)). Our Eighteen Nation Committee has already passed on to the concrete elaboration, not of a new outline, but of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament.

I think it useful to recall that the preamble to this treaty, submitted to the Conference by the two co-Chairmen and endorsed by the Conference at its meeting of 17 April, is called "Draft preamble to the treaty on general and complete disarmament" (ENDC/L.11/Rev.1).

Consequently the Romanian delegation asks the United States delegation to agree upon a correct title for Part I, which, being meant to define the essence of obligations deriving from the treaty, must have a suitable title. The title "General Treaty Obligations" best meets this requirement.

Most representatives present here have insisted upon the necessity and importance of establishing a global time-limit for the achievement of general and complete disarmament. It seemed that there was a general consensus on the inclusion in article 1 of words providing that "general and complete disarmament will be achieved in years" and that the actual number of years should be established by negotiation. In any case, we heard no objections from the United States delegation to this solution. We realize, however, that the wording submitted by the United States delegation for paragraph 2 of article 1 completely evades the problem of the time-limit within which disarmament is to take place, and provides only that States shall assume the obligation to carry out certain measures. However, the establishment of precise time-limits, both for each stage and for the process of general and complete disarmament as a whole, is absolutely necessary.

This necessity derives, first and foremost, from the need to give States the firm assurance that the obligations assumed under the treaty will be observed by each party in respect of his own obligations, and that the measures agreed upon will be carried out by all within an agreed time-limit. After all, this is a problem of confidence, about which much has been said -- and rightly so -- during our debates. In order to have confidence in the success of disarmament, peoples, governments and States should know from the very beginning the duration of the disarmament process, the time that will have to pass until we reach the final goal we have all agreed

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upon -- the destruction of the means of waging war, and thus the elimination of war from relations between States. Without the establishment of some strictly determined time-limits, the achievement of any disarmament measure whatever is inconceivable. Without a clear perspective of the duration of the process of general and complete disarmament, a disarmament treaty is inconceivable as well.

This aspect of the problem was made very clear by the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, at our meeting on 11 April. On that occasion he declared:

"We are convinced that every disarmament measure, every stage of general and complete disarmament, and, indeed, the execution of the treaty itself, must be carried out within a precise time-limit -- that exact dates must be set for their completion. A legal obligation without a date is not even an obligation."

(ENDC/PV.18, p.18)

The inclusion in the treaty of precise time-limits, and their strict observance by all States, further derive from the necessity for a prompt and effective control of the way in which each party to the treaty fulfils the obligations incumbent upon it.

There exists a unanimous view as to the necessity of a rigorous international control being set up over the concrete measures of disarmament. Is it not evident that such control is impossible without a precise global time-limit and, within this time-limit, without precise data of the duration of each stage of disarmament in part? How can we verify if one State or another is complying with an obligation if we do not know from the start the time-limit within which that obligation must be fulfilled? In this connexion, how could the State which was not complying with its obligations under the treaty be "called to order" if no time-limit existed for the achievement of concrete measures of disarmament?

During our debates I have already had the opportunity to point out that responsible persons in the United States have declared that, in regard to the United States plan, the establishment of a global time-limit is out of the question. I quoted on that occasion Senator Humphrey, who said that nobody knew whether nineteen years would be long enough for the United States and the Soviet Union to disarm. I also quoted Mr. Foster, a member of the United States delegation and the Director of the United States Arms control and Disarmament Agency, who -- and I am sorry to have to quote him once more -- said:

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"And, of course, this is not a nine-year plan. We have set three years as the first stage. There is a transitional stage during which one appraises whether the appropriate amount of progress has been made on which you can go to the next stage. Another stage of three years, another transition. A last stage which may be -- I don't know; we are not wise enough to appraise how long that will be." (ENDC/PV.41, p.7)

On 24 May I asked the United States representative to explain to us the view of his delegation as to the general time-limit for disarmament (*ibid.*, pp.5 et seq.). But the United States representative has not answered so far. The explanation of this attitude is certainly not discourtesy, but the fact that there is no global time-limit which Mr. Dean could indicate. What is important here is not the fact that the United States delegation is in a difficult situation and does not wish to show its weakness. What is important is -- and this is unacceptable to any State which really wants disarmament -- that the United States draft does not propose a precise time-limit for the achievement of disarmament, thus creating an uncertainty which is in total contradiction with our aims.

During our meeting of 1 June Mr. Dean said that the inclusion of an obligation regarding the time-limit for the implementation of general and complete disarmament in part I of the treaty "... would be premature and not particularly helpful" (ENDC/PV.47, p.21). We cannot agree with this way of thinking. On the contrary, we consider -- and we are convinced that this is the opinion of most delegations present at this Conference -- that it is imperatively necessary and entirely opportune that article 1, paragraph 2 should provide for the obligations of States --

"To carry out, over a period of years, general and complete disarmament entailing: ..." (ENDC/40/Rev.1, p.2).

Nobody is suggesting that we should settle now, at this stage of our debates, the concrete duration of the process of disarmament. We are well aware that, because of the stand of the United States delegation, this is hard to achieve now. But, if the assertion of Mr. Dean to which we referred is not to be construed as hiding the refusal of the United States to assume an obligation with regard to the duration of the process of general and complete disarmament -- and we hope that is the case --, we do not see what could prevent the United States delegation from adopting the reasonable language proposed by the Soviet Union.

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Let us see what is the stand of the United States delegation with regard to the transition from one stage to another. From a certain point of view, this problem is closely linked to the previous problem, namely the global time-limit of disarmament. From another point of view, the transition from one stage to another directly concerns the very essence of general and complete disarmament. The United States plan provides for the transition from one stage to another to be organized in such a way as to create numerous possibilities for every big Power wishing to put an end to the process of disarmament to resume the arms race, with all the consequences deriving therefrom. This has been demonstrated often enough for us not to be obliged to go into detail now. I cannot refrain from recalling, however, that according to the United States plan the transition from stage I to stage II is conditional not only upon the achievement of disarmament measures, but also upon the carrying out of studies and the fulfilment of other measures which depend on subjective appreciations.

With regard to these aspects of the United States plan, I have also asked the representative of the United States some precise questions. But up to now he has not answered my questions. Here again, I am sure that his silence is not caused by a lack of courtesy, but by his being unable to give a satisfactory answer. The wording of article 1, paragraph 5, proposed by the United States delegation shows that no modifications have occurred in the stand of the United States in this problem. The United States delegation continues to condition the transition from one stage to another upon a number of factors liable to subjective appreciations.

I should now like to make another comment. The United States delegation is, in fact, opposing a ban on nuclear weapons. This is a problem of the utmost importance. The very danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war determines the entire importance and urgency of disarmament. The very existence and the continuous increase of nuclear weapons make the elimination and banning of these weapons an essential problem, a goal to be reached first within the process of general and complete disarmament. While the Soviet variant on this point -- I am referring to article 1, paragraph 2(b) of the joint text -- provides for the prohibition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and for the elimination of all stockpiles of such weapons, as well as for the cessation of their production, the United States variant provides only for the banning of the production of weapons of mass destruction and not for the banning of their use. If we consider that

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according to the United States plan all nuclear weapons, as well as 70 per cent of the means of delivering them to their targets, are to be maintained after the disarmament treaty comes into force, and that both nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them to their targets continue to exist at the end of stage II of that plan, this means that in the view of the United States Government the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction would be lawful during the entire process of disarmament.

Let us recall that the United States delegation at the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly opposed the adoption of the declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. More than that, the United States delegation voted even against the paragraph of the preamble of that declaration which reads:

"Believing that the use of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, is a direct negation of the high ideals and objectives which the United Nations has been established to achieve...". (A/RES/1653(XVI), p.2)

Evidently here again it is a question not of nuances, of a difference in wording of the same idea, but of a stand of the United States Government, a stand opposed to the aspiration of the peoples that nuclear weapons be banned and eliminated. The extent to which the policy of the United States is opposed to this ardent desire of all peoples is stressed once more in the statement of the Soviet Government concerning the decision of the United States Government to start nuclear weapon tests at an altitude of several hundred kilometres (ENDC/43). Such a step, extending the armaments race to outer space, will deal a heavy blow to the efforts for peaceful research in outer space and will endanger the lives and health of people. The Romanian delegation fully supports the view expressed in the statement of the Soviet Government. The news in today's press concerning the accident which occurred with a nuclear explosion in outer space confirms these views. Everybody asks today: what about the nuclear load that now lies in the Pacific? When is it going to explode, and how many victims will have to pay with their lives for this experiment? It is necessary to stress that if the United States Government does not renounce the decision to conduct nuclear weapon tests in outer space, it will assume a grave responsibility for all consequences deriving from such action.

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In these circumstances it is easier for us to understand another divergence between the Soviet and the United States delegations: that concerning the armaments which are to be used as equipment for the forces to be put at the disposal of the United Nations if need be.

The Soviet variant envisages in this regard -- and I am now referring to article 3, paragraph 3 -- that the United Nations peace force will be equipped with agreed non-nuclear armaments. This provision is in accordance with the very essence of the Soviet plan, which calls for effective measures for the neutralization of nuclear weapons in stage I and for the elimination of these weapons in stage II. That is logical, is it not? If there are no nuclear weapons, the peace force does not need such weapons, nor can it have them.

The United States plan also has a logic of its own, but it is the logic of a proposal which does not meet the aspirations of the peoples, the logic of a proposal which tries to maintain nuclear weapons and to perpetuate the danger of a nuclear war. The United States delegation does not admit the inclusion of the word "non-nuclear" in the sentence referring to the equipping of the United Nations peace force with armaments. There is only one explanation for this: the United States Government intends to create an international force equipped with nuclear weapons. But if the United States Government stands for the liquidation of nuclear weapons, as it claims it does, why is the creation of an international nuclear force proposed to us? For what purpose? This is a question the United States delegation has not been able to answer satisfactorily in this Committee.

The arguments used by Mr. Dean on 31 May and by Mr. Stelle on 1 and 4 June are not such as to change our opinion; on the contrary they strengthen it. Referring to the armaments to be given to the United Nations peace force, Mr. Dean asserted: "My Government has an open mind on this question." (ENDC/PV.46, p.37). Mr. Stelle, in turn, declared:

"The United States Government and the United States delegation have not taken a position upon whether the United Nations peace force should or should not be equipped with nuclear weapons. We say that, as of this time, we are not prepared to take a position until after further thought, discussion and negotiation, either for or against." (ENDC/PV.47, p.41)

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Do these declarations not clearly reflect that the United States does not exclude at all the possibility of the international force being given nuclear weapons? What we are demanding now is that the United States Government and the United States delegation take a clear, unequivocal stand with regard to this matter at once, and not later on. Mr. Chairman -- and I am addressing you now in your capacity as representative of the United States --, we shall discuss this problem again and again, always bringing forward new arguments, not because we want to mark time or to introduce elements which would prevent the progress of our negotiations, not for the sake of sterile controversies, but because we have become deeply convinced -- and the United States delegation has repeatedly helped us to become so convinced by its declarations and by the way in which it has drafted certain provisions of part 1 of the treaty -- that in such an essential problem as that of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons the United States Government is not determined to save mankind from the most dreadful nightmare of our times, and does not want to declare itself openly and clearly for the complete destruction of nuclear weapons.

We should be very glad if this open-mindedness to which Mr. Dean was referring were to manifest itself in a renunciation of the idea of equipping the United Nations peace force with nuclear weapons. We should be very glad if this open-mindedness were to manifest itself now, when we are drafting the general part of the treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The Romanian delegation is not the only one to take a stand against the equipping of the United Nations forces with nuclear weapons. Other delegations are doing so as well. I shall quote in this connexion only the Indian representative, Mr. Krishna Menon, who said in this Committee on 20 March:

"... my country would never agree to the idea that there should be an international force which would use nuclear weapons in the future." (ENDC/PV.5, p.33)

I shall stop here. I could have pointed out that the United States variants of the paragraphs of the document submitted to us include the idea -- unacceptable for reasons which have been repeatedly explained -- of control not over disarmament but over armaments, and that these variants contain a stubborn refusal to provide for the liquidation of all military bases on foreign territory and the withdrawal and disbanding of all troops stationed on the territories of other States.

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These are some preliminary remarks which call for the conclusion that the United States delegation will have to give up its unrealistic stand, a stand contrary to the interests of the peoples, so that we may arrive at a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Once again I say: if you are against nuclear weapons, then include among the obligations of States that of banning nuclear weapons and their use. If you are for the dismantling of military bases on foreign territories, then please say so and include a provision to this effect in that part of the treaty containing the general obligations of States. If you want States to start disarming, then provide a time-limit for the unfolding of the process of disarmament. Only thus can we prove that absolutely everybody in this hall is energetically and resolutely fighting to achieve general and complete disarmament, which is our main task. Words, however pretty, cannot replace facts. The peoples of the world are expecting facts, and as soon as possible.

Mr. LALL (India): It is very good to see you back in our midst today, Mr. Chairman, and we hope that you had a good journey both ways.

Today I am going to speak on the Working Draft of Part I of the treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/40/Rev.1). However, before I do so I should like to say a few words about nuclear testing.

I take the liberty of making these remarks because, as the Committee well knows, the Government of India has very strong views about nuclear testing. I would remind this Committee that it was Mr. Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, who first brought the matter of nuclear testing before the General Assembly by addressing a letter, in April 1954, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. So we do take a clear stand on this matter. Mr. Nehru has repeatedly said that the Government of India is opposed to all testing at any time and by whomever the tests might be carried out. That has been our consistent position, no matter who might test.

I should like to draw attention to certain remarks made yesterday, which I think highlight the concern of the world regarding this situation. Mr. Zorin, the representative of the Soviet Union, read into the record a statement by the Soviet Government on the United States high-altitude nuclear explosions. In the course of this statement he said:

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"If the United States Government puts its intention into effect and sets off the high-altitude nuclear explosions it has planned, it will bear the full responsibility for seriously complicating the international situation." (ENDC/43, page 5)

Immediately after Mr. Zorin had spoken, Mr. Stelle, the representative of the United States, took the floor; and he said at the end of his statement that --

"... the Soviet Government ... thereby bears complete and sole responsibility for the consequences." (ENDC/PV.48, p.10)

If I may say so with great respect to these two very great Powers, it is all very well for them to pin responsibility for the consequences on one side or the other. But on whom do the consequences fall? The consequences fall on us, on the rest of the world. I submit that it is totally unfair of the very great Powers to engage themselves in a course -- and I say this with great respect to both of them -- from which consequences flow affecting all of us.

Recently in this Committee I cited some appalling figures of the long-term genetic effects of the present series of nuclear tests, and of those which were conducted last autumn by the Soviet Union. Yesterday we saw an extrapolation taken from an official publication -- I believe from the United States -- which said that there would be 50,000 genetic casualties as a result of the present series of United States tests; most of those casualties will not be in the United States, so far as I can make out from the press report.

I should like to say that this situation of pinning responsibility on to each other, as though you were the only two concerned, is very unrealistic. Many other people are concerned. It is inexplicable that we should repeatedly have to bring up this point. And yet there is no change; the tests go on.

We are confused because yesterday again the newspapers reported that the Chairman of the Division of Geological Sciences at Harvard has asserted that underground nuclear explosions can be detected and distinguished from earthquakes with available instruments.

Apparently experts say different things: Some experts say this cannot be done, while some experts say that it can be done. In any event we feel that in matters like this, where there is doubt among experts, political people -- whose responsibility is not merely to scientists but to the world at large -- have an obligation to stop doing things regarding which there is doubt.

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In order to show how a spiral is being created, I should like to quote one more passage from the statement Mr. Zorin read out:

"Only the short-sighted can believe that the United States of America will derive any military advantage from conducting high-altitude nuclear tests. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will see to it that this does not happen." (ENDC/43, p.5)

I take that to mean that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will also conduct such tests. I have no doubt that after that happens some other government will say, "We must now conduct tests, too" -- and so it goes on.

I raise this matter in great sorrow, and I hope that at some time in the near future those who are mainly responsible for conducting these tests will stop testing.

I say again in all frankness that the joint memorandum of the eight non-aligned States at this Conference (ENDC/28) is a firm and sufficient basis for an accord, which we hope can be reached.

I now come to the document on Part I of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. We have listened very carefully to the statements of the two co-Chairmen and to the other statements which have been made on this matter, and, though I do not want to minimize the differences in concept which explain the parentheses, both single and double, in this document, I am bound to say that I do not think that these differences in concept are as deep as they appear to be at first sight. In this connexion I should like to quote from your own statement, Mr. Chairman, on 1 June where you were explaining why your delegation favoured a certain title for this document and certain phraseology in connexion with the opening part. You are recorded as saying:

"Rather, we do not think it would be wise, or indeed make good sense, to obscure the true nature of part I. We are concerned that if we deleted the words 'Outline of' from the title of Part I or the words 'with the following general purposes' in the introductory sentence, we would be creating a general illusion of progress and agreement, which would not really be warranted and which indeed might cause much trouble in drafting later on." (ENDC/PV.47, p.18)

What is the sense of that, Mr. Chairman? Is not your main point there that, if we were now to call these things obligations, and not remember that they were merely an outline and these were the general purposes, then we should create an

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illusion that we had already reached agreement on obligations, and that this would cause difficulty later in drafting? Exactly: I see, Mr. Chairman, that you indicate this to be your sense. I would suggest that that is of course true at this moment of time; but once we have drafted and agreed upon the whole treaty, I presume that, in accordance with your own logic, Mr. Chairman, you would agree that there would be no objection to calling these obligations, because then there would be a direct correspondence between these obligations -- of a general character albeit -- and the more detailed obligations which will be found in the actual disarmament stages of our treaty. At that time they can be called obligations.

Therefore, since we are now looking at these documents only provisionally, for the first time, and since the treaty must be agreed finally as a whole, including part I and the substantive stages of disarmament, surely the time will come when this concept and the other concept -- to which I will now refer, quoting from Mr. Zorin's statement -- will meet? This is what Mr. Zorin said:

"The Soviet Government considers -- and this is reflected in the draft treaty it has submitted -- that the general obligations of States relating to disarmament, and to control over disarmament and over the concomitant measures for maintaining peace, must be firm and definite. Only then can there really be general and complete disarmament ..." (ENDC/PV.47, pp.34,35)

That is the Soviet Union concept.

The other concept, Mr. Chairman -- your concept, if I may say so -- is that at this stage it is premature to crystallize these obligations. But then, surely the determining point is that there will come a time when we shall agree the treaty as a whole, and at that time these can be hard and fast obligations. Indeed, if I may say so, quite a lot of the difficulties in this particular document will, we believe, be obliterated when we have reached agreement on a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. When that has happened, these parentheses here, single and double, will easily fall away, because we shall know exactly where we stand in the whole scope of disarmament, regarding the matters which are spelt out in a general manner in this Part I document.

With those introductory remarks I will now take the liberty of making a few suggestions, not really thinking that they will be adopted at this time, but in the light of the first remarks which I made, that these difficulties will be ironed out in time when we reach agreement on the substantive treaty.

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I take, first, paragraph 2 at the bottom of the first page of the document, the portion in single parenthesis, the words which the United States would like to have here:

"(Taking into account paragraph 1 above and the requirements of the United Nations Peace Force provided for below, to provide, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:)"

(ENDC/40/Rev.1, p.1)

May I say that, in my view, this links up with the double parenthesis in article 3, paragraph 3 on page 5, around the word "~~((non-nuclear))~~"? It seems to me that once we can agree -- and here I express the view of the delegation of India -- that there should be only non-nuclear armaments for the United Nations peace force, then this part in single parenthesis, which the United States would like to have in, can well be maintained. Therefore in certain circumstances we have no objection at all to the United States parenthesis, the circumstances being that a firm decision be taken in due course that the United Nations peace force will be armed only with non-nuclear weapons.

Now I should like to mention the double parenthesis at the top of page 2, which refers to "a period of years" for general and complete disarmament to be completed. I must confess that I was a little surprised to find that this was in double parenthesis and in fact was not without parenthesis. I will say why. I had thought that the view had been expressed from all around our Committee that it should be possible to work out the total period of time in which general and complete disarmament would be completed. I should like to refer to Mr. Cavelletti's statement of 11 April:

"The time-limit for the treaty will be the sum of the periods we set for the various measures and the various stages of general and complete disarmament, as we proceed with the formulation of the treaty. There would thus be an agreed time-limit for the whole treaty."

(ENDC/PV.18, p.36)

I supported this in a statement which I made immediately after the representative of Italy, and I believe that other statements have been made to the same effect by Powers associated with Italy, though I cannot quote them.

But I will draw attention to a part of the communique after the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in March 1961. I believe it was our colleague from Romania who on 24 May drew attention to that communique. He pointed out that its

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paragraph 3(b) said that the programme of disarmament, once started, should be continuous without interruption until completed (ENDC/PV.41, p.6). From that, plus the fact that the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) says that each stage of disarmament must be completed in a specified period of time, it follows that we can fix the time for the overall disarmament plan; and I take it that my colleagues of the United Kingdom, Canada and Nigeria are bound by this statement just as much as is the delegation of India. Therefore I am right in saying that from all parts of this House the view has been expressed that the total length of time which will be required for general and complete disarmament is an ascertainable period. So I was somewhat surprised to find the double parenthesis, in fact any parenthesis at all, around that sentence at the top of page 2, and I trust that on reconsideration it will be possible for those parentheses to fall away quite quickly.

I now turn to paragraph 2(b) on page 2, which deals with nuclear weapons. Let me say very briefly that the delegation of India would favour the retention of all the wording in paragraph 2(b) -- that is to say, including the portions placed in parenthesis both by the Soviet Union and by the United States. We would accept the wording of both co-Chairmen, which shows how liberal we are, since the co-Chairmen have suggested alternative wording. This is a matter of great importance; and even if there is a certain amount of overlap we consider that it would be better to take both sets of wording than to err on the opposite side.

I think I am right in saying that yesterday Mr. Stelle argued that there was not much difference in meaning here, and that was why the delegation of the United States did not think it was necessary to include the wording of the Soviet Union. I feel that here we can have a little over-emphasis if necessary; let us have all the wording and let the parentheses drop. If the co-Chairmen are contending that they are using words with the same meaning, let them drop the parentheses. I think that would be a very acceptable way to solve this particular issue.

I must say I think that this proposal is supported by the statement made either by Mr. Dean or by Mr. Stelle in which he agreed that no State should have these dangerous weapons in its hands. He went on to say that he was not quite sure what should be the position of the United Nations force, whereas he was quite sure that no State should have these dangerous weapons in its hands. It seems to us to be a natural step from saying that no State should have these weapons in its hands to realizing that it would be impossible for the United Nations peace force to have

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these weapons in its hands. For if no State should have these weapons in its hands, then where would such weapons be stored, manufactured, tested, and so on, if the United Nations peace force were to have them? I am speaking now purely in terms of formal logic, although our objection to these weapons in the hands of the United Nations peace force is much deeper. We do not think that it is really practicable for no State to have these weapons and yet for the United Nations peace force to have them.

With great respect to any doubts that any delegations might have on this subject, I would submit that it is impossible to conceive of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world -- to take the phrase used by President Kennedy and by the United States delegation in all these documents -- while someone has the possibility of using nuclear weapons with their appalling destructive capacity, not just at the moment at which they are used, but on future generations. This is a law of destruction to which we cannot subscribe at all. As has been pointed out today already, the representative of India at this Committee has stated categorically the view of the Government of India, that we can never agree to the prospect of the United Nations peace force being armed with weapons of mass destruction of this character.

May I now turn to paragraph 2(g), dealing with the discontinuance of all military expenditures? We should like to see added here that expenditure on military research should be prohibited. We think it might be possible to say, "Discontinuance of all military expenditure from all sources, including expenditure on research on military weapons." If we added the words "from all sources" after "all military expenditure", perhaps that would cover the point which the Soviet delegation has put into double parenthesis, and the parenthesis could in due course fall away.

I now turn to page 5, paragraph 2(c), dealing with "(peaceful and neighbourly relations)" and "((peaceful and friendly coexistence and co-operation))". I heard Mr. Stelle or Mr. Dean say that the Soviet Union had a sort of patent on the word "coexistence". I must beg to differ from them. I am sure that they read English literature and I hope they have both read T.S. Eliot's "Four Quartets". Originally T.S. Eliot was an American, but now he is British. He is a very great poet. In "Burnt Norton", which was published in 1940 and is the first of the "Four Quartets", the word "coexistence" will be found. The word is not a patent of any country, and as someone interested in literature I object to that view. T.S. Eliot is the

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greatest living poet, by common agreement, in the English language, and he used the word "coexistence" before it was employed in General Assembly resolutions, or by the Soviet Union, or even by the delegation of India.

Perhaps if we can accept the position that this word "coexistence" is not a patent of any country, it might be possible to iron out this matter, again by using most of the words in both parentheses, and perhaps by dropping the word "the" before "principles". I think some stress was laid on the word "the" by the representative of the United States; he thought that it was difficult to discern these principles so accurately. If the word "the" is dropped, then one can talk of "basing relations with each other on principles of", and both sets of words could be used after that without doing violence to anyone's concept of international life.

I now turn to the last paragraph on which I wish to comment: article 3, paragraph 3. This is an important paragraph dealing with the United Nations peace force. Again, it is our hope that all the parentheses can disappear. There is a long parenthesis put in by the delegation of the United States, and we would accept the sense of it very happily. We would also plead strongly for the acceptance of the words "((in accordance with the United Nations Charter))" to be found in the second and third lines of that paragraph. I cannot quite see that it is desirable to omit those words. I should have thought that it was a matter of great regret that so far Article 43 of the United Nations Charter had not fructified. In other words, the Charter of the United Nations does provide for a force, but unfortunately the arrangements under which that force is to be brought into being have never been completed.

What we are saying here is that we all accept the obligation, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to carry out provisions of the Charter which, unfortunately, have so far not been carried out. I should have thought that we should all be very glad indeed that what had not happened so far was going to happen now, and that a further and absolutely categorical assurance was being given here that this would be carried out, unlike the obligation in the Charter which says that this will be carried out in a certain complicated way. Here is something which I should have thought we should all accept very readily.

I have already talked about the word "non-nuclear", and I do not have to stress the point again, important though it is. As I have said, we feel that the last part which the United States delegation would like to have in this paragraph, and

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to which the Soviet delegation has apparently objected, should be included. We think it is a valuable addition, and at the very most it might be turned around somewhat. If the Soviet delegation cannot accept this exact wording, surely it should accept the almost similar wording contained in the Joint Principles, on which this wording is based. We would hope that this could be done and that, by thus removing all three sets of brackets suggested by both sides, paragraph 2 could fall into place in an agreed manner.

Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia): Before discussing the Working Draft, the Czechoslovak delegation would also like to express its full agreement with the statement made at our meeting yesterday by the Soviet delegation regarding the United States nuclear tests at high altitudes. We have already had an opportunity in this Committee to voice the position of the Czechoslovak Government deploring the resumption of nuclear tests in the atmosphere by the United States as a heavy blow to the Committee, to the question of disarmament, to efforts to bring about an improvement in the international climate, and to the cause of peace itself.

The United States nuclear explosions at high altitudes may have very serious consequences the extent of which is incalculable even by scientists. These explosions, which may interrupt radio communications for a long period, constitute a serious threat to important factors of international coexistence and co-operation. They may affect air and sea transport in particular and may endanger research in outer space, where man's endeavour has recorded magnificent achievements in recent times both by Soviet and by United States scientists. It is also necessary to point out that the United States explosions at high altitudes may cause serious disturbances in the higher strata of the ionosphere and will considerably increase the danger to humanity resulting from radioactive fall-out.

As was stated by our Romanian colleague, the news this morning about the failure of one of these tests does not in any way diminish these risks and preoccupations. On the contrary, it creates a new risk which, again, is so far incalculable. These tests are also a marked example of how serious is the attitude of the United States Government in proclaiming that outer space should be used only for peaceful purposes. On the one hand, the United States delegation pressed that the question of the peaceful use of outer space should be given priority of discussion by the Committee of the Whole; and on the other hand, as we saw when we discussed the first stage of general and complete disarmament, it refused to adopt the proposal to eliminate all nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage, which would really lead to the attainment of this objective.

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Moreover, the present United States high-altitude tests mark the beginning of a new intensification of the nuclear arms race, and in outer space itself. There is no need to emphasize that this decision of the United States Government is a further obstacle to co-operation and will obstruct efforts to save outer space for peaceful purposes only. It is obviously a complication to our work in this Committee. The Czechoslovak delegation regards the United States nuclear tests at high altitudes as a further regrettable step taken by the United States Government, which will bear full responsibility for all the consequences that may ensue therefrom.

Having said this, I should like to make some comments on the Working Draft of Part I of the treaty on general and complete disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union and the United States, with the differences set out in that draft. The Czechoslovak delegation regards these three articles, the draft of which we are considering today, as a very important part of the future treaty. Indeed, they set forth the extent of the disarmament obligations which States will undertake by signing the treaty. They also contain the main principles of control, and measures for the settlement of disputes under conditions of general and complete disarmament.

Figuratively speaking, Part I constitutes a skeleton of the whole programme of general and complete disarmament, which is worked out in detail in the following parts and articles of the draft treaty. It is natural that the main differences of views which we have been witnessing in our whole debate appear in the serious effort to formulate Part I of the treaty. It is possible to resolve these differences only if we approach the task from the common basis on which we in this Committee are working and which we are trying to solidify and widen. In this sense my delegation would like to express its appreciation of the genuine and sincere effort manifested just now in the speech of the representative of India, Mr. Lall. I think we should all study his suggestions -- I am sure we shall -- and try to follow his example in finding ways to bridge these gaps and to eliminate these brackets and double brackets.

I think it is necessary that we should all stand firmly on this basis of common endeavour; and in this sense it is necessary for us to insist on the provisions of Part I being clear, accurate and binding to the maximum degree; then the later work of the Committee in elaborating individual measures of the treaty on general and complete disarmament will be substantially facilitated. On the other hand, if we allow in Part I ambiguities or provisions which might have a double interpretation, we shall be faced with a number of obstacles and the main task before the

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Committee-- that is, elaborating the treaty on general and complete disarmament -- will be made considerably more difficult. This is the principal standpoint from which the Czechoslovak delegation proceeds in considering the draft of Part I submitted by the two co-Chairmen.

Although we have a number of observations to make, as certainly all our colleagues on the Committee have, I would like to limit myself to the following, because the others have been covered in observations made by other socialist delegations and by some other colleagues who have spoken before me.

First of all, as to what should remain of arms and armed forces after completion of the general and complete disarmament programme -- that is, in article 1, paragraph 1(b), paragraph 2(a), and article 3, paragraph 4 --, we believe it is correct that the treaty should stipulate that the States should have at their disposal strictly limited contingents of police or militia equipped with corresponding weapons. Indeed, the very concept of general and complete disarmament presupposes and demands that all armed forces and their armaments should be disbanded and eliminated, including their specific organization, structure and internal order which corresponds to the functions and tasks to be discharged by armed forces. These functions and tasks, to be carried out by forces left to the States after completion of general and complete disarmament -- both on an internal and international scale -- would be fully secured by the police or militia units.

This is not a question of semantics, as is often argued here; it is a question, not of titles, but of principle which follows directly from the mission which armed forces on the one hand and police units or militia on the other hand are to fulfil. The difference in substance lies in particular in the fact that armed forces are capable not only of individual actions but also of war operations. To these tasks and functions correspond the whole organizational pattern and armament of the armed forces on the one hand, and of the police or militia units on the other hand. Therefore, the demand that under conditions of general and complete disarmament States should be left only with the contingents of police or militia for the implementation of tasks envisaged in the treaty on general and complete disarmament is fully justified and well grounded.

The Czechoslovak delegation deems it well-founded that Part I of the treaty on general and complete disarmament should contain an explicit obligation of States to refrain from using the contingents of police or militia remaining at their disposal

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upon completion of general and complete disarmament in any manner other than for the safeguarding of the internal security of States, or for the discharge of their obligations to maintain international peace and security under the United Nations Charter, as is proposed in article 3, paragraph 4, by the Soviet delegation.

It is our belief that this provision should be acceptable also to the delegations of the Western Powers, since it seems to us to correspond to an idea that came from their ranks. In fact, on 24 May the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, voiced concern that States with a large population might misuse their numerically superior police or militia units for aggressive actions against their weaker neighbours (ENDC/PV.41, p.33). The undertaking of the obligation proposed by the Soviet delegation would help to eliminate that danger and would give a sound basis for eliminating it completely.

One of the basic tasks of the general and complete disarmament programme is to deliver mankind from the danger of a destructive nuclear war once and for all. In this sense I think we all agree here, although we may and do differ as to the stage in which this danger should be eliminated.

In our view, the treaty on general and complete disarmament cannot limit itself to provisions concerning the physical destruction of the existing stockpiles of these weapons and the prohibition of their production. A significant step toward permanent elimination of the threat of a nuclear war, as well as of a war where other types of weapons of mass destruction would be used, demands an explicit prohibition of these weapons. What puzzles me in this regard is the opposition of the United States delegation and its allies to having such a provision in article 1. There can be only one explanation: it seems that nuclear weapons, as the basis of their military and strategic concepts, have got hold of the thinking of the military and political leaders of the NATO countries to such an extent that they simply cannot imagine a world free from nuclear bombs. Therefore, they appear to try to preserve nuclear bombs, and, together with them, the possibility of unleashing a nuclear war.

I have had an opportunity of speaking on this subject on several previous occasions, and so I am not going to dwell on it any longer. But that seems to be the only reason which explains why the United States delegation refuses to agree to the strict prohibition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. They are trying to convince us that such a prohibition is superfluous since full liquidation of stocks of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of their production would, allegedly, also eliminate their use; this was maintained at our meeting yesterday by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber.

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This argument, however, seems to be disproved -- or at least seriously weakened -- by the fact that the United States at least admits, and even seems to presuppose, that the peace force should be equipped with nuclear weapons. This appears clearly from the discussion on this subject and from the repeated statements by the representatives of the United States that in this respect the United States Government has not taken any decision. If it has not taken any decision, it must admit the possibility of equipping the peace force with these weapons. That means that even after the completion of general and complete disarmament nuclear weapons would continue to exist, and even to be used. So while there was in the treaty a formal agreement that nuclear weapons should be eliminated, those weapons would be reintroduced by the back door, so to speak, of the peace force.

There is another deep contradiction in the position of the United States -- a contradiction which was very ably pointed out just now by the representative of India. That is that on the one hand the United States delegation assures us that the United States outline envisages the complete elimination of all existing stock-piles of nuclear weapons and the complete prohibition of their production, while on the other hand it envisages admitting -- or not excluding -- the equipment of the peace force with these weapons. This raises the question: From where would the peace force, if it were to be equipped with nuclear weapons, get these weapons? Where would they be manufactured, and so on? If in keeping with the United States outline all nuclear weapons would be liquidated and their production prohibited, and if in keeping with the assurance we get from the Western delegations the nuclear weapons would be completely eliminated, then it would be impossible to equip anyone with them, even the peace force. Then what is the reason for the United States delegation's refusal to agree to the explicit provision that the peace force should be equipped only with non-nuclear arms? If, however, the United States envisages the equipping of the peace force with nuclear armaments, its representatives cannot assert that the United States outline envisages the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons and the complete prohibition of their production.

The two possibilities cannot exist at the same time, and I must state with regret that the position held by the United States delegation seems to testify to the fact that what the United States envisages is the second alternative: that is, the alternative which leads to the legalization of nuclear weapons and to their permanent preservation, even after the completion of general and complete disarmament. Thus also, of course, the danger of a nuclear war would continue to exist.

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In our view there can be no doubts and no exceptions in the question of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The nature of nuclear weapons is such that the very idea of ensuring order, security and peace by means of nuclear bombs is paradoxical. I would even say it is monstrous; and, of course, condemnable. Therefore a strict prohibition of nuclear weapons, which would lay upon States not only moral obligations but also definite obligations in the sphere of international law, is a necessary part of the treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Concerning military expenditures, referred to in article 1, paragraph 2(g), the Czechoslovak delegation believes that it is in no way sufficient if States undertake an obligation to discontinue them in their State budgets only. At our meeting on 1 June the United States representative said that what the Soviet Union proposed to add concerning organizations or private individuals was unclear to him (ENDC/PV.47, p.21). With all respect, I must say that this surprises the Czechoslovak delegation a little, coming from a representative of the United States. The role played by the German monopolies such as Krupp and Thyssen, and other organizations and individuals, in the financing of the Freikorps, Schwarze Reichswehr, etc., in violation of disarmament obligations laid upon Germany by the provisions of the Versailles Treaty is a commonplace. This, of course, was far back in the 'twenties and 'thirties, but there is no need to go so far back into history as that; and here I submit that the United States delegation is obviously better informed in this respect than anybody else.

Why not recall the role played by the United Fruit Company in the financing and organizing of the attack by Castillo Armas bands from Honduras and Nicaragua against Guatemala in 1954? The United States delegation could perhaps say better than anybody else who paid for -- and who pays for -- the gangs of mercenaries to fight against the Republic of Cuba; who financed their expensive preparation and training at such bases as Retalhuleu in Guatemala and elsewhere; and who made available means for the criminal adventure which ended in failure at Playa Girón and Bahía de los Cochinos last April? Here, as I think Mr. Dean will certainly admit, it was not a question of a simple purchase of hunting weapons. And, since Mr. Dean maintained that in the United States and "in most other countries, private individuals do not engage in military expenditures" (ibid.), are we to understand

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that these acts were financed from the State budget of the United States -- as was suggested by Fidel Castro and by the Cuban Government? In this case I am afraid that in examining the State budget of the United States we would have much more difficulty than Mr. Stelle has suggested one would have in examining the State budget of the Soviet Union, and perhaps of other socialist States.

Another example from recent history is the rôle played by the Union Minière in the arming and maintenance of armed bands in Katanga. I would like to quote an authoritative statement on this by the President of Ghana, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, at the 961st plenary meeting of the General Assembly, at the fifteenth session, on 7 March 1961:

"Through the control of the Congo banking facilities, the Belgian Government or, if not the Belgian Government itself, financial interests in Belgium closely associated with the Government have had money at their disposal to hire mercenaries from abroad and to purchase the most modern and up-to-date arms and munitions."

(Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session,
961st plenary meeting, paragraph 75)

All this leads my delegation to support the inclusion of the paragraph on military expenditures in Part I of the treaty, article 1, as proposed by the delegation of the Soviet Union.

In concluding, I should like to say that the document submitted by the two co-Chairmen on Part I of the treaty on general and complete disarmament reflects the measure of agreement reached and the differences in opinion still existing on this issue. We do not close our eyes to the fact that these are major differences. However, as I said previously, we appreciate any honest effort to eliminate the brackets and double brackets in order to bridge the existing gaps.

We shall find it necessary to come back to these differences in due time and try for a rapprochement, or to iron them out. The delegations of the socialist countries are doing and will do everything within their power in order that agreement may be reached. We feel that it will be necessary to put aside the old lines of thinking and the old concepts which have been mentioned here and which seem to us to be still predominant in the thinking of the NATO countries, namely, their reliance on the nuclear weapons deterrent, their desire to replace general and complete disarmament by arms control, and so forth.

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In conclusion, I should like to say that, if all sides involved will show sufficient goodwill, it should be possible to reach a satisfactory solution on the wording of Part I of the treaty in our further deliberations.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): The Italian delegation has given its full attention to the consideration of the later stages of disarmament to which the Conference has devoted the meetings of the last few weeks, and has listened with particular interest to the detailed explanations given by the United States and Soviet delegations concerning those stages. My delegation wishes to express its satisfaction at the serious and detailed study of this draft, the first reading of which is already well advanced and will probably be completed before the Conference adjourns.

We are thus beginning to have a more complete picture of the problems involved, and, though I am aware of the difficulties that lie ahead, I am convinced that this month's work has at least improved our understanding of each others' problems. In this process of clarification I think the assistance given by the delegations of the new members of the Conference has been valuable, and I am sure it will continue to be so, thus constituting a most useful element for our future agreements. This optimistic view may be somewhat darkened by the tone of certain statements made yesterday by the delegations of the Socialist countries. Those were not positive elements for the atmosphere or the smooth progress of our work.

But my delegation wishes to examine the substance of the problems and the essential character of our debates, which in the main are quite encouraging. We do not feel discouraged, even when we note that the working draft of Part I of the treaty represents only partial agreement. Everyone was aware from the outset that the task of this Conference was extremely difficult, and it is in the light of these difficulties, which were well known and taken into account, that we must interpret and evaluate the progress of our work during the first reading of the draft treaty.

In its statement on 24 May last the Italian delegation, while speaking on the first stage of disarmament (ENDC/PV.41, pp.27 et seq.), had occasion to make certain comments on the second and third stages of the two draft treaties, with particular reference to the transition from one stage to another, the powers of the Disarmament Organization and the international police forces of the United Nations.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I shall therefore confine myself today to a few further remarks on these later stages of disarmament, endeavouring to follow the logical line our work should take in order that the treaty which the Conference will be called upon to adopt at some future time may emerge from the various proposals before us.

At the meeting on 31 May, Mr. Godber, the United Kingdom representative, gave us (ENDC/PV.46, pp.21 et seq.) a comparative survey of the two disarmament plans with particular reference to the second stage, which was also characterized by a feeling of confidence I fully share. But although it is true that when we consider the last stage of the treaty the common objective is clearly apparent, it is none the less true that the ways proposed for reaching the objective are still very different, that is to say, there is serious disagreement on the measures to be included in the various stages of the treaty.

In proposing a toast at a luncheon, an eminent colleague compared our work to the jumping course at a horse show. Taking up this apt comparison we might say that in reality we are confronted with two possible courses, one of which is short but bristles with extremely difficult, perhaps insurmountable obstacles, while the other is longer but has easier fences which we are confident of being able to jump.

I do not wish to revert to certain reasons which should prompt us to take the less difficult course. I have already referred in a previous statement to the necessity of adopting a gradual method of disarmament, in order to provide for the gradual rebuilding of mutual trust and to overcome material or technical difficulties in the destruction of armaments. These are, moreover, fundamental questions, which have also been discussed at length by other delegations. But since we are discussing the second stage, I should like to add that the very concept of a treaty in several stages, which is accepted by everyone here, suggests that we should spread the different disarmament measures over each stage. In my view, the very idea of stages has inherent in it the adoption of a gradual and progressive system, in the sense that all the different disarmament measures should be homogeneously distributed over the various stages of the treaty.

If you tried to concentrate a particular disarmament measure in a single stage -- say the total elimination of certain categories of weapons-- you could not avoid a serious imbalance which might prevent disarmament from being carried out. For instance, the main Soviet proposal for the second stage-- the total elimination of nuclear weapons-- again raises the whole problem and all the difficulties arising

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in the first stage in connexion with another total measure proposed by the Soviet delegation: the elimination of vehicles. I am aware that for both proposals, particularly the total elimination of nuclear weapons in the second stage, the socialist delegations have a reason which seems valid. This is the desire to give priority to removing the most serious danger-- that of nuclear war. Who would not be in favour of removing this terrible danger as quickly as possible? But it must really be possible to do so. In our opinion, this most formidable danger cannot, unfortunately, be entirely eliminated until the end of the process of general and complete disarmament, when all the means of waging war, both nuclear and conventional, will have been liquidated and the world is organized for peace. Any other solution would be illusory and would only serve to give the peoples a false sense of security.

For it must not be forgotten that in the second stage a large contingent of armed forces is retained, both under the Soviet plan and under the American plan. Since these forces, with their weapons, remain in service, the danger of war is not eliminated. The retained forces, whose armament we do not know precisely under the Soviet plan, might commit an act of aggression. A few weeks would then be enough for the conflict to turn into a nuclear war.

The discoveries of science cannot be eliminated or erased from human memory. We know that the application of the treaty would not prevent the existence of factories for the production of missiles and nuclear materials intended, of course, for peaceful purposes. But once war had broken out it would be easy to convert these establishments to military production, and before very long the conflict would inevitably turn into a nuclear war.

It may be objected that under the Soviet proposals States would have to assume a legal obligation not to use nuclear weapons. The Soviet delegation has told us that according to its proposals the use of those weapons would be a crime against international law. Is it this legal protection that would guarantee us against a nuclear war if a conventional war were to start? We should like to believe it, because we stand for a peaceful world organized on the basis of international law. But to prevent the infringement of this legal rule a United Nations international police force sufficiently strong to enforce respect for international law would be required as early as the second stage. We know this is not easy, because organization for peace and the international police forces will not have reached their full development until the end of the disarmament process. Moreover, the

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Soviet delegation, which proposes making a legal rule against the use of nuclear weapons, seems to be opposed, so far, to the constitution of a real international police force.

In our opinion, it is not the question of the armament of this peace force, which was raised again this morning by the representatives of Romania, India and Czechoslovakia, that is the heart of the problem at present. What is causing us concern is that the delegations of the socialist countries seem opposed to the very principle of the existence of international forces capable of guaranteeing us a peaceful world in which the smallest countries would be properly protected.

Thus the radical measures proposed by the Soviet delegation for the first and second stages do not ensure that a nuclear war could not develop from any future conflict. Real security must be found in the abolition of all weapons, whether nuclear or conventional. This objective can only be attained by the gradual execution of a disarmament plan under which some of the weapons in every category are eliminated at each stage.

Once the logical force of this necessity is accepted, once such a method has been agreed on, I am convinced that we shall not have much difficulty in agreeing on the time-limits for each stage and for the treaty as a whole. This is the problem which Mr. Macovescu, the representative of Romania, referred to this morning in his comments on certain statements made previously by my delegation. Mr. Lall, the representative of India, was also good enough to quote these statements by the Italian delegation. I should like to reassure Mr. Macovescu and Mr. Lall that neither the Italian delegation nor, I think, any other delegation here, wishes to prolong the disarmament process unnecessarily, provided that it is applied in accordance with balanced criteria which can really ensure mutual security.

I should now like to say a few words on the difficulties of verifying the application of the measures provided for in the second stage, if we accept the Soviet proposal calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. I will not go into the technical details, although they are fundamental. For we know that in the present state of science, verification of the total elimination of nuclear bombs involves serious difficulties which would have to be overcome by detailed studies. I only wish to consider the logical data of such verification. I have already followed a similar argument chain of reasoning with regard to the total elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage, asking the Soviet delegation for precise explanations.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

We agree that for a partial disarmament measure there should be partial control, by zones or otherwise, in order to prevent unduly extensive control creating dangers of what the Soviet delegation calls "espionage". But I think we also agree that for total disarmament there must be total control. The Soviet delegation has spoken of 100 per cent control of the elimination of vehicles. Now in practice it is impossible to apply partial control and total control during one and the same stage of disarmament. If, in the same stage, whether it be the first or the second, partial disarmament measures-- armed forces and conventional weapons-- are mixed with total measures-- elimination of vehicles and bombs-- it becomes impossible to apply control. The application of total control in a given sector, whether it be nuclear weapons, delivery vehicles or nuclear weapons themselves, would be superimposed on the partial control prescribed for the other measures.

There are only two alternatives: either we have total control of all armaments before the first stage, which is not acceptable to the Soviet delegation, or control is inadequate. For the forces retained in service, whether in the first or the second stage, should only be subject to partial control, since they are subject to a partial disarmament measure. But, I ask again, how can we make sure that these forces are not equipped with nuclear weapon vehicles or nuclear bombs that should have been eliminated in the first or the second stage? How can we verify that, without applying the total control which the Soviet delegation is only willing to accept at the end of general and complete disarmament?

Once again you can see that a sense of realism, even in regard to control, leads us to favour a gradual application of disarmament with a rational and balanced distribution of all the measures in each stage.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): In my capacity as the representative of the United States I should like to make the following statement.

Although three or four of my past several statements have been devoted to the problem of the elimination of nuclear weapons during the course of general and complete disarmament, the representative of the Soviet Union has not, I am sorry to say, so far been convinced, because he appears to continue to make his attacks, which I submit are without foundation, on the United States programme on this subject. Indeed, Mr. Zorin's statements on 1 June and 4 June appeared to me to be further examples of his efforts in this regard. I have the impression that

(The Chairman, United States)

Mr. Zorin has been trying to cultivate the idea that the United States is somehow opposed to concrete provisions for the total liquidation of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of every State. Nothing, I assure the Committee, could be further from the truth.

Today I shall use the occasion of a review of some parts of stage II of the United States treaty outline to make our position clear beyond the shadow of a doubt. It seems to me that common sense and simple logic alone would be sufficient to bring any objective student of the disarmament problem to the conclusion that the continued possession of nuclear weapons by any nation must be incompatible with general and complete disarmament. In fact, possession of such weapons by a supposedly disarmed State would amount to a contradiction in terms.

Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Working Draft of Part I of the treaty (ENDC/40, Rev.1) shows no disagreement between the Soviet and United States delegations on this issue of eliminating nuclear weapons from national arsenals. We are not in agreement, to be sure, on whether the future United Nations peace force should have any nuclear weapons, the difference between us being that the Soviet Union would wish to prohibit this categorically right now, whereas the United States would prefer to leave the question open for later decision. When we say "leave the question open for later decision", what we mean is that the decision should depend upon reaching broader agreement on the details of the treaty, and upon the views of all the nations that might wish to come in and sign the treaty. Having taken these things into consideration, we should then decide whether we think it wise to say that the United Nations peace force should not have any nuclear arms under any circumstances, even though it might subsequently be discovered that someone else had nuclear arms. I think that this is about as clear as I can make it.

There is a complete identity between the Soviet Union and the United States on the point that there should not be any nationally-held nuclear arms. Since this is the case, the difficulties remaining are not those of fundamental objectives but only of means or modalities, how we shall go about liquidating nuclear weapons and how we shall allocate the various steps to the various stages of the disarmament process.

The United States has never doubted that steps should be undertaken as early as possible to start the world clearly on the road to denuclearization. For this reason we have included various measures in each of the three stages of our

(The Chairman, United States)

disarmament programme. It is our intention that the first stage should freeze the competition in the production of nuclear weapons at its present point and then begin to reduce existing stocks. The second stage is to make very great inroads into existing weapons stockpiles. The third stage is to witness their total elimination.

Let me enumerate again the measures which we propose for the first stage. The five concrete steps would provide for the following:

First, the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons.

Second, the transfer of an agreed quantity of fissionable materials to purposes other than for use in nuclear weapons.

Third, the transfer of fissionable materials between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy only.

Fourth, an agreement on the non-transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear Powers.

Fifth, prohibition of nuclear weapons tests if no prior agreement on this measure has been reached.

Several misconceptions would appear to have arisen in connexion with the extent and significance of these measures proposed for the first stage. Therefore it seems to me that this is a good time to dispose of whatever doubts may exist.

For example, the representative of India, Mr. Lall suggested on 1 June that the Western plan did not provide for a progressive squeezing down across the board of all arms components to zero, as we have claimed, because, he pointed out, in the first stage, while the United States plan proposed a 30 per cent cut in nuclear weapon vehicles and conventional armaments, it did nothing to cut nuclear weapons themselves (ENDC/PV.47, pp. 12 et seq.). Let us examine this to see if the conclusion is well founded.

In the first place, our United Kingdom colleague made yesterday the very sound point that a percentage cut in nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage would have the effect of reducing nuclear weapons even without the application of any direct measures of reduction to the weapons themselves (ENDC/PV.48, pp. 16, 17). The same result, however, would not flow from the total of 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage, as suggested by the Soviet Union draft treaty, because regular weapon vehicles would be out of the picture in its plan for 100 per cent elimination and all of the nuclear weapons could be available, as I have pointed

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out previously, for delivery by improvised vehicles such as converted jet transport planes. However, with only a partial cut, as the United States has proposed, enough genuine vehicles would remain so that no improvised vehicles would have any military value, and the number of nuclear weapons that could be effective would be strictly determined by the number of genuine nuclear weapon vehicles still retained.

The second reason why we have trouble with the conclusion advanced by the representative of India is that the United States programme does, we submit, address itself to the problem of nuclear weapons in the first stage. We believe that we have attempted to do whatever is feasible in the circumstances prevailing in that stage. Because of control uncertainties and complexities, we just do not know, as of now, that it will be feasible to tackle the nuclear weapons themselves, as such, in the first stage. Of course, we recognise that nuclear weapons just cannot exist without fissionable materials, and therefore we advocate that a fixed quantity of such materials be turned over to non-military uses, under effective international controls, by the United States and the Soviet Union.

We have suggested, as you know, that this fixed quantity be 50,000 kilogrammes of fissionable materials (ENDC/PV.2, p.21; PV.23, p.10), but we do not consider this figure fixed or sacred. Our aim is to determine some quantity of fissionable materials which will in fact force -- I repeat, force -- the nuclear Powers, even in the first stage, to make some cut in their stockpile of nuclear weapons, just as all non-nuclear weapons will also have to be reduced. I believe that the view has been expressed here that the figure of 50,000 kilogrammes is too small because it could be taken out of surplus stocks of fissionable materials which are not now used in weapons. If this is a troublesome matter, I would ask Mr. Zorin to suggest a larger quantity. We would be very happy to have him suggest a larger quantity, and we would be glad to discuss it with him. We are completely open to all valid ideas as far as first stage measures of nuclear containment are concerned.

As I said a moment ago, we hit upon this approach because of the very difficult problems inherent in working out effective control arrangements over the elimination of nuclear weapons themselves. The Soviet Union is on record, as you know, a number of times here with acknowledgements of the rather great difficulties involved in verifying that a total liquidation of nuclear weapons has been achieved, even though an obligation to this effect has been undertaken. I refer the Committee to the Soviet disarmament proposals of 10 May 1955 (DC/SC.1/26/Rev.2) and 23 September 1960 (A/4505).

(The Chairman, United States)

In contrast, the present position of the Soviet delegation would appear to be that this is a mere technical detail of control and that, once the disarmament obligation in regard to disposing of nuclear weapons has been agreed to, the verification arrangements can be worked out quickly. In view of the long history of this problem, we believe that a clear and firm understanding on monitoring procedures is an essential prerequisite to any commitments regarding the complete disposal of nuclear weapons.

If our Soviet colleagues are really disturbed about scheduling a study for such control problems in stage I, lest a negative outcome to such a study provide a loophole for not eliminating nuclear weapons, we in the United States delegation have offered to have this issue studied in detail before a treaty is even signed-- that is, during the period of negotiations itself, provided of course that enough time for suitable preparations is allowed before the study begins. We still believe that a serious study should be instituted of the question of transferring an agreed amount of fissionable materials to non-military uses.

I say this because any controls which may be devised after studies of the problem are likely to be fairly broad and rigorous in scope; and, as is the case with similarly broad controls for the reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles, it will probably become easier to apply the controls during the second stage than in the first. Therefore the only real question is to hit upon a transfer figure which is really meaningful in terms of the objective of forcing a cutback in nuclear weapon stockpiles.

It is quite evident that this provision for transfer is closely tied to two other first-stage measures: that is, a ban on nuclear weapon tests and a cut-off of production of fissionable materials. The latter step will prevent the further growth of stockpiles and thus will limit the further increases of nuclear weapons. The first step will prevent the development of more advanced nuclear weapons that have been proved to be reliable, and this will mean that the nuclear Powers will have little or no incentive for taking fissionable materials out of existing weapons and refabricating such materials into more advanced weapons.

The Soviet delegation has argued that it would be inadmissible to permit the control of plants fabricating fissionable materials during stage I, as would be required by the United States proposal for a stage I cut-off. The Soviet delegation asserts that international supervision over such plants fabricating fissionable materials would amount to a control over the whole Soviet nuclear armaments industry.

(The Chairman, United States)

The Soviet Union rejects this as constituting a control over armaments, because it notes that the cut-off would not, by itself, prohibit or prevent the manufacture of new nuclear weapons.

I am sorry to say that I cannot follow this logic. As we see it, the Soviet Union should have no objection to the inspection of plants fabricating fissionable materials, once there is a 100 per cent stoppage of military production. In fact, the Soviet Union itself proposes such full controls over shut-down plants in other categories, even in stage I. It is true that some fissionable material plants will continue production of limited quantities for peaceful purposes. However, I am sure that the Soviet Union would not object to the control of such output, any more than it would object to the control of continued production at plants formerly producing missiles which, in stage I of the Soviet plan, are thenceforth restricted to producing space launching vehicles for peaceful purposes.

As I am sure everyone here is aware, the plants producing fissionable materials are not at all the same plants which fabricate the nuclear weapons themselves. All of the nuclear Powers take fissionable materials from the producing plants and transport them to other arsenals where the actual preparation of nuclear weapons is undertaken. The United States does not, of course, propose that any controls be installed over such nuclear weapons factories in stage I.

It can thus be seen that the United States programme approaches stage II with a very substantial record of accomplishment behind it in stage I as to nuclear weapons. The aim of stage II measures is to carry forward the work started in stage I and to use measures of a more advanced type which are commensurate with the greater degree of confidence --- and control --- which will exist in stage II. Let me explain how this will be done.

The stage II provisions concerning nuclear weapons, that is, warheads, fall into two main subdivisions. First, there is the direct reduction of nuclear weapons and second, there is a registration of nuclear weapons.

In the light of the examination of control procedures by the commission of technical experts in stage I, or even before treaty signature, stocks of nuclear weapons in stage II would be reduced to minimum levels. This reduction would be preceded by a declaration of the amounts of fissionable materials held by each nuclear Power and would be accomplished by the transfer of agreed quantities of fissionable materials from nuclear weapons to non-weapon stockpiles for future peaceful uses. The non-nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons from

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The production, fabrication, or reworking of nuclear weapons from remaining fissionable materials would be subject to rigidly-controlled and agreed limitations. Further, all the nuclear weapons remaining in the last six months of stage II would be registered with the international disarmament organization.... This would be intended to facilitate verification during stage III to ensure that no nuclear weapons remained available for use by any State.

In this further review of the portions of stages I and II of the United States outline programme which deals with the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, I hope that it has become apparent to all delegations that our plan is indeed realistic and effective on this subject, as it is on all other aspects of disarmament. Despite the peculiarities of nuclear weapons and of the verification problems connected with their liquidation, we have tried to ensure that their reduction will begin in stage I, as is the case with all other weapons. The steps advocated for stage II would guarantee a very major further advance towards the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons in national possession.

At the same time, we make no pretence of closing our eyes to monitoring difficulties; these have been recognized for a long time by all nuclear Powers. Since nuclear weapons are such a key factor in the existing arsenals of the great Powers, control over their liquidation is as crucial a factor as any other single item in the disarmament programme. We propose to face this frankly and at an early stage of the disarmament effort. Indeed, it would be our preference to clarify the verification situation even before our negotiations on a treaty have been completed, so that the requisite provisions can be spelt out in the treaty itself.

I will not take any more time this morning in making specific criticisms of specific provisions of the Soviet disarmament plan relating to nuclear weapons because I have done that several times before. However, it will be recalled that we object to the concentration of all measures in stage II. We believe strongly that it would be much sounder to spread these measures over all three stages. This corresponds to our view on the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles and to both the Soviet and United States views on the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces.

It is apparent to us that the reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles will require very rigorous control measures, and that such measures will become even more exacting as we approach the final goal of total liquidation. I do not think

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there can be any doubt on this score. In view of the known attitudes of the Soviet delegation towards controls in the early stages of disarmament, the less drastic Western approach which, initially at least, calls for less comprehensive controls, seems to us much more feasible. It would give a chance for confidence to develop, and we could then use this confidence to make the necessary larger leaps towards the final objective. I am still hopeful that the Soviet delegation will re-examine its proposals in this light and consider modifications in the direction of our plan.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian).

Today we have listened attentively to a number of statements, and I want first of all to observe that the Indian representative's statement on several questions, including nuclear tests, is of great interest to us all. I think it should be taken into consideration by all the nuclear Powers, especially the one which is now conducting tests and ignoring every rule of international law, and also the opportunity of concluding an agreement on the discontinuance of tests presented by the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States (ENDC/28), which has been accepted by the Soviet Union as a basis for negotiation and agreement.

I also want to draw the attention of all those taking part in our negotiations to what I consider the constructive proposals made by the representative of India, in particular on questions related to the Working Draft of Part I of our treaty (ENDC/40/Rev.1). In the light of what the United States representative has just said about elimination of nuclear weapons, I should like him to clarify his attitude towards the Working Draft of Part I, about which the representative of India has just spoken.

The representative of India has put forward the definite compromise proposal that in article 1, sub-paragraph 2(b), which concerns nuclear weapons, all the brackets should be deleted, both from the phrase proposed by the Soviet Union: "((Prohibition of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons for mass destruction;))", and from the phrase expressing the United States point of view: "cessation of the production (and prohibition of the manufacture) ..."-- in other words, that we should accept both the Soviet Union proposal and the United States proposal.

I can state that the Soviet delegation agrees to this proposal and is willing both to drop its own brackets and to accept the bracketed United States words. If the United States is really in favour of prohibiting nuclear weapons and other types

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of weapons of mass destruction, it should have no objection to this proposal of the Indian representative. If it does object, then it should explain its position - why it objects to the prohibition of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction. Quite obviously the wording of the United States proposal merely to prohibit manufacture, as I demonstrated yesterday, does not solve the problem of prohibiting nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction in general.

I can understand the United States objection to dropping these brackets from our phrase "Prohibition of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction" only by assuming that the United States does not want prohibition of nuclear weapons. It is reserving them for the international force. The United States representative seemed, in his explanations today, to mean precisely that. He said at the beginning of his statement that there is no disagreement between us on the elimination of nuclear weapons from national arsenals, but that we are not agreed on how the international force should be armed. That seems to be the precise reason why the United States does not want to prohibit nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction in general.

The representative of Czechoslovakia has today rightly asked where, if you want to eliminate nuclear weapons from national forces and to prohibit their manufacture in States, you will manufacture them at all for the international force if you want to equip it with them. Will you establish international arsenals for their manufacture? Is that how we are to understand your position? I think that is a perfectly proper question to ask. In any case we should like full clarification of the United States position: whether it accepts this proposal of the Indian representative to delete all the brackets from article 1, paragraph 2(b), or whether it does not.

The second reasonable compromise proposal made by the representative of India is to delete all the brackets from article 3, sub-paragraph 2(c), on relations between States. He has proposed that the brackets be dropped both from our words "peaceful and friendly coexistence and co-operation" and from the United States words "peaceful and neighbourly relations". I can say already that the Soviet delegation agrees to this proposal to delete both our and the United States' brackets-- if, of course, the United States agrees.

If the definite article before the word "principles" causes any difficulty for the United States delegation, we agree that this definite article "the" should also

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be deleted, for the sake of complete agreement on article 3, sub-paragraph 2(c). It will then read: "base relations with each other on principles of peaceful and neighbourly relations and peaceful and friendly coexistence and co-operation".

I do not think this should cause any difficulty for the United States delegation, which I hope will accept this compromise proposal.

Those are the two observations which I wanted to make now on the statements by the Indian representative and the United States representative. As for the other remarks by the United States representative concerning the elimination of nuclear weapons in our plan and in the United States plan, I do not want to detain all the delegations now; I think we can return to this matter later on. However, I should say now that today's argument has added nothing and has in no way strengthened the United States position on this question, since it is obvious to everyone that there is in fact no real reduction, even of nuclear weapons, in either stage I or stage II of the United States plan. You have not answered the question which the representative of India asked the United States delegation before: by what percentage the United States contemplates reducing nuclear weapons in stage II. You cannot answer it because you do not in fact lay down specifically in your plan what will be reduced by what percentage and by what actual quantity of nuclear weapons. You speak in stage II of your plan merely of a reduction of fissionable materials, not of actual nuclear weapons. We shall revert to this question later; I want to confine myself now simply to this brief general observation.

Now I should like to pass on and reply to certain questions which were raised in yesterday's debate. In expounding the Soviet draft of stages I and II of general and complete disarmament, the Soviet delegation dealt at length with reduction of military expenditures, control over the new lower level, and the use of funds saved through disarmament. However, the statements we heard at yesterday's meeting compel us to refer to these matters again.

The Soviet Government attaches great importance to reduction of military expenditures in the chain of disarmament measures. Reduction of military expenditures cannot be considered merely as a consequence of the elimination or reduction of armed forces and armaments. It is an important measure in itself, creating additional safeguards to ensure that disarmament will be really lasting and that armed forces and armaments will not be built up again. It is therefore not accidental that all the Soviet proposals which the Soviet Government has ever submitted have invariably included provisions for reduction of military expenditures.

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The draft treaty compiled by the Soviet Government and submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee contains, for each of the three stages, precise undertakings regarding reduction of military expenditures. It is fitting to recall that article 13 of stage I of disarmament deals with this question. It provides that, proportionately to the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons and the discontinuance of their production, to the dismantling of foreign military bases and withdrawals of foreign troops from alien territories, and to the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, States are obliged to reduce their military budgets and appropriations for military purposes (ENDC/2, p.12). Our draft treaty talks of the proportionate reduction of military expenditures. This means that, after the execution of these measures, States' military budgets and military appropriations will be limited to the level necessary for supporting the temporarily-retained armed forces and armaments.

We propose to use all funds released through the implementation of the first-stage measures for peaceful purposes so that they shall not be re-diverted to the manufacture of armaments. They will be used to reduce taxes on the population and to subsidize the national economy. Desiring to promote the development of practical co-operation between States, we provide that a certain portion of the funds thus released shall be diverted to economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries.

As over every disarmament measure, the Soviet draft treaty provides for reliable control over reduction of military expenditures and appropriations. This control is to be carried out by the international disarmament organization through financial inspectors, to whom the States parties to the treaty undertake to grant unhindered access to the records of central financial offices concerning the reduction of the budgetary allocations of States in connexion with the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign military bases and the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, including the relevant decisions of their legislative and executive bodies.

In stage II of disarmament our draft treaty lays down a further reduction of military budgets and appropriations for military purposes in full accordance with the disarmament measures scheduled for this stage. Members of the Committee can verify this by studying article 26 of the draft treaty. Consequently, following

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the principle of extending control to match execution of the disarmament measures of the draft treaty proposed by the Soviet Government, we envisage an extension of the powers of the international disarmament organization in the second stage with regard to verification of the budgets of States.

The measures for reducing military expenditures and appropriations at the third stage are set forth in article 35 of the draft treaty. This article provides for discontinuance of the appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form, whether from government bodies or private individuals and public organizations. All the funds now channelled in different ways for maintaining the military machine would under our proposals be directed to peaceful uses only. The international disarmament organization would have virtually unlimited power to control the budgets of States, and right of access to legislative acts and budgetary documents of States parties to the treaty.

In this context it is impossible to ignore the intervention of the United States representative, Mr. Stelle (ENDC/PV.48, pp. 34 et seq.). The general purpose of his remarks seemed to be to sow doubts about the possibility of real diminution of military expenditures, and to discover new justifications for the United States' demands on control.

Mr. Stelle said that different States had different systems of budget appropriations and so could not be easily compared or be controlled. We agree that States have different systems of budgetary appropriation because of the differences between their economic systems. This is a perfectly natural fact, and we take it into account in our proposals. However, Mr. Stelle's conclusion that the difference in the systems of budgetary appropriations raises an almost insurmountable obstacle to control over reduction of military expenditures is groundless.

In an attempt to justify his conclusion, the United States representative ventured a number of remarks about the budgetary estimates of the Soviet Union. He argued that the Western Powers' budgets were public budgets and subject to parliamentary control, while the Soviet budget was secret and not subject to any kind of control. In doing so Mr. Stelle used expressions like "we are informed", and "we believe" (ibid., pp.36, 37). Mr. Stelle's informants about the budgetary system of the Soviet Union are unknown, but I do not think they inform him very accurately.

Mr. Zorin, USSR)

The Soviet economy is a planned economy, and budgetary control has enormous importance in the planned development of our economy. Therefore Mr. Stelle's arguments about the alleged ambiguity of the Soviet estimates are entirely groundless. The Soviet Union budget is subject to general discussion in the Supreme Soviet, both in its budgetary commission and in plenary, and not only in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The budgets of the republics and other administrative units of the Soviet Union are studied equally freely and widely by their parliamentary bodies. This is the true picture of the control exercised by the peoples' representatives over budgetary expenses and the State estimates.

Mr. Stelle put forward as a merit of the United States budget the number of pages submitted to Congress for examination. However, one could recall quite a few cases in which the people of the United States have been kept in ignorance of the destination of the taxpayer's money. For instance everyone knows that for a long time huge sums, billions of dollars, were kept secret and spent on the invention and production of nuclear weapons. That has been published in the United States press. Years passed before these vast expenditures became known.

Let us take a very recent example, when a change was made in the leadership of the United States Intelligence Services. It then came to light that enormous sums, not appearing in the budgetary estimates of the United States and apparently not subject to debate in the United States Congress, were set aside for subversive activity, for subsidizing various bodies, including the right-wing socialists in whom the Dulles organization saw, and the McCone organization now sees, the true advocates of their policy of hostility towards peace and co-operation between peoples.

The United States representative also mentioned prices. The system used in the Soviet Union is not to his liking. Of course our system differs from that of the capitalist world. But in any serious discussion of reliability of control over military appropriations, in this case also the comparison would clearly not be to the advantage of the United States. One need only look at the latest newspapers to see how the prices on the American Stock Exchange have vacillated. In this Stock Exchange game a not inconsiderable part is played by armaments manufacturers who make fabulous profits out of the arms race. Does that not explain the pessimism of the United States representative about the possibility of reducing military expenditures as a substantive measure of disarmament?

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We ourselves are firmly convinced that reduction of military expenditures is a key factor in the whole complex of disarmament measures. There is nothing to prevent exercise of the necessary control over military expenditures in all countries if the matter is tackled in earnest. We have put forward proposals for that purpose, and their acceptance would guarantee that States conformed exactly to their obligations to reduce military expenditures.

It is most important to us that the treaty the Committee is drafting should completely preclude recrudescence of armaments and armed forces. That is why we have made our proposals on the prohibition of appropriation of funds for military purposes, whether on government budgets or from public organizations or private individuals. Unless the treaty expressly requires the cessation of military expenditures from organizations or private individuals, a very serious -- and we would say dangerous -- situation could arise.

At yesterday's meeting Mr. Godber, the United Kingdom representative, said that he was not entirely clear what we had in mind here. And he added:

"Unless our Soviet colleague can give us far clearer examples of what he fears in this regard, I would not think this is an important matter." (ENDC/PV.48, p.23)

I said yesterday, and I should like to repeat today, that we are prepared to help Mr. Godber and hope that this will not only enable him to understand the question but also help us all to reach agreement.

Clearly he must be well acquainted with the London newspaper The Sunday Times, and I can only suppose it was through inadvertance that he overlooked a very interesting news item. An article in the supplement to this newspaper for 18 March 1962 states:

"In one West London factory alone are now stacked enough small arms to equip several private armies -- 170,000 rifles, between 10,000 and 12,000 revolvers, 5,000 pistols. The same firm, Cogswell and Harrison, has 9,000 machine-guns stored in other depots and operates from old-established Piccadilly premises. It is one of three ancient gunmakers now controlled by Samuel Cummings, 35-year-old principal of the International Armament Corporation (Interarmco), largest of the enterprises making a livelihood from buying and selling arms."

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This article also states that Interarmco, when supplying weapons to private armies, obtains a considerable part of its stocks from the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. It might seem, if the Western representatives are telling the truth about the strict parliamentary control over the military budgets of the Western Powers, that Mr. Godber, who appears to be in close touch with parliamentary affairs, should know what sums change in such a case.

This article also indicates where these arms in which Interarmco trades have gone and are going. It mentions countries like Spain, South Africa and Rhodesia, and familiar names like Batista and Trujillo. Needless to say, these names are directly linked to wars against peoples. That is where the blood is shed which settles as gold in the safes of Interarmco. Surely this is sufficient reason why the treaty should block for ever such really criminal private operations and private financing of armaments.

If this example is not enough, there are others. The very well known American corporation the United Fruit Company maintains private armies in Latin-American countries and subsidizes the armed forces of the various dictators who obediently give it land in their countries. The representative of Czechoslovakia today produced a concrete example of this. It is also possible to produce an example more familiar to all representatives here: the events in the Congo, where the Union Minière in fact maintains an army of mercenaries who are fighting the Congolese people.

How, after all this, can the matter which the Soviet delegation has raised be said not to be an important matter? On the contrary, it is a very important matter, if we intend to stop playing with words and to solve the problem of disarmament and of armament financing in fact. We have already referred at one of our meetings to the role played by the Ruhr magnates in arming the Hitler gangs and then the Reichswehr, which plunged Europe and the whole world into the second world war. The peoples do not want this to happen again, and so we are insisting that all loop-holes and vents through which new forces of war and aggression may re-emerge shall be sealed.

The prohibition not only of budgetary appropriations but also of all appropriations of non-governmental organizations and private individuals has great importance, as can be seen from the examples quoted, which Mr. Godber requested yesterday. That is the reason why the Soviet delegation insists on including appropriate provisions in the draft of article 1 of the treaty, which deals with general obligations related to disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): The name of the representative of the United Kingdom is still on the list of speakers. Does he wish to speak now, or would he prefer to defer his statement until tomorrow? I should be quite happy to have him speak now. I would only say that my co-Chairman and I have an appointment at 1 o'clock with the President of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. If, therefore, the representative of the United Kingdom wishes to speak now, we shall have to ask to be excused from the meeting.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I do not think that I had better accept your invitation, Mr. Chairman. Much as I should like to speak today, I think that it would be better if I waited until tomorrow. I should hate it, on the one hand, if anything that I had to say should delay the meeting which you and your co-Chairman are anticipating, and on the other hand if you should be deprived of the words of wisdom which I hope to deliver. Therefore I will, with your permission, defer my statement until tomorrow.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its forty-ninth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Dean, representative of the United States.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Romania, India, Czechoslovakia, Italy, the United States and the Soviet Union.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 6 June 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

